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1. Introduction 
 
This paper reports about laboratory experiments concerning traffic behaviour of 
participants with different cultural backgrounds. We used a classifier system for 
behavioural types, which was introduced by Selten et al. (2007). It can be shown that 
different cultural backgrounds may have an influence on the cognitive decision process in 
binary choice situations; we used a route choice scenario. Two subject pools with 54 
participants each were analysed:  
 
1. German students at the University of Bonn (Germany). 
2. Chinese students at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Nankai University 
(China).   
 
Obviously the traffic situation in Chinas densely populated cities differs from the German 
and most Central European areas. The traffic in China’s cities is much more 
heterogeneous. Especially in Shanghai are more bikes, motorcycles, pedestrians, cars and 
busses on the road at the same time. In Germany as in most other countries of the 
European Union there are often extra lanes for busses, taxies and bikes. Our approach is 
not comparing the traffic situations inherently, but it could give a better understanding 
whether traffic participants in China act more anticipatory in view of the more complex 
situation on the roads, than the German traffic participants. It seems necessary to react in 
a different way in China. 
 
During the last two decades cross-cultural comparisons and differences had been studied. 
Empirical data was used to gain a deeper inside of different countries. The investigation 
of the economic performance and the social capital in different countries and nations was 
the target in several studies. Gambetta (1988), Putnam (1993), and Fukuyama (1995, 
2001) shown that the social capital affects the performance and the economic success of 
organizations and the economy. La Porta et al. (1997), and Fukuyama (1995, 2001) 
reported that social and civic norms of cooperation have an impact on institutions and 
aggregate economic activity. 
 
Cross-cultural studies using an experimental setup have become an important field in 
economics research. The most common experimental designs are various specifications 
of the ultimatum game, the trust game, the dictator game and  public good games 
example in Buchan (1997), Botelho (2000), Burns (2004), Carpenter (2004), Chuah 
(2005), Henrich (2000, 2001, 2004), Oosterbeek (2004) and Roth (1991). The authors 
report that social norms depend on the cultural background of participants. Camerer 
(2003) remarks that offers and counteroffers are a language with nuance and cultural 
variation in bargaining experiments.  
 
A comparison between the Western and Asian cultures is discussed in Hofstede, (1980). 
The authors conclude that the relative dominance of individual versus collective interests 
is the explanation of the differences in the cultural behavior. Some Business studies use 
the Confucian value system and the Chinese socio-economic structure as an explanation 
for the cultural differences in negotiation and decision-making processes e.g. (Tung, 
1989; Child and Marcoczy, 1994).  
Important attributes of cross-cultural experimental studies (e.g. Anderson et al., 2000; 
Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2001; Buchan et al., 2004a,b) is the sequential application 
of an identical experimental setup within selected areas while controlling for stakes, 
language, experimenter effects and demographic background variables (Roth et al., 1991, 
Camerer and Kagel, 1995; Walkowitz et al., 2004; Dakkak et al., 2006). 
 
In our study we designed a simple minority game to explore different response modes of 
a Chinese and a German group of participants. The two response modes (chapter 3.2) will 
explain payoff and coordination differences between the cultural groups.  
 
Characteristic for a traffic situation worldwide is that many subjects have to interact 
without a negotiation procedure. Since there is an inherent lack of communication, 
optimal coordination is rather unlikely. The only way to increase individual benefit, what 
means to decrease individual travel time, is to adapt individual decisions to the behavior 
of the other participants; which could be observed in the past. To model such a situation 
we used a simple Minority Game. 
 
The Minority Game is an example of a n-person game with no strict pure equilibria and 
can be applied on different situations including their specific social and economic 
contexts. The Minority Game, which is also called the El Farol Bar Problem and was 
introduced by Arthur (1994) and theoretically analysed in detail by Challet & Zhang, 
(1997, 1998). There is already some literature about experimental studies of the game. 
Helbing et al. (2005), Renault et al. (2005), Chmura & Pitz (2006), Bottazzi & Devetag 
(2007) and Kets & Voornfeld (2007). 
 The rules of the Minority Game can be described in a short way: a number of agents n 
have to choose during several periods whether to enter a given room A or a room B. 
Those agents who choose the less crowded room win whereas the others lose. Our aim is 
to present Minority Game experiments with a large number of periods and with 
sufficiently many independent observations for meaningful applications of non-
parametric significance tests.   
 
Market entry games (Rapoport et al 2002, Erev and Rapoport 1998) are another kind of 
games found in experimental literature, which can be compared in some aspects with the 
Minority Game. In these types of games players usually have the choice either to enter a 
market or to stay out of it. The payoff for entering the market is a decreasing function of 
the number of entrants. The payoff for staying out is a constant opportunity cost. One 
may say that the route choice game is similar to a market entry game with two markets 
instead of one. However, the players do not have the choice to stay out of both markets.  
 
A number of experiments on route choice behaviour could be found in the literature (e.g. 
Bonsall 1992, Mahmassani & Liu 1999, Selten et al. 2007, Chmura & Pitz 2006).  Here, 
we focus on the route choice behaviour in a generic two route scenario, which has already 
been investigated in the scientific literature (e.g. Iida et al. 1992). In Helbing et al (2002) 
volatile dynamics of decisions independent of an optimal payoff distribution were 
observed in route choice experiments. It could be shown that specific guidance strategies 
are able to increase the performance of all users by reducing overreaction and stabilizing 
the decision dynamics. In De Martino (2004) a model for analysing the emergent 
collective behaviour of drivers in a city was discussed. The results proved that in absence 
of information noise, inductive drivers turn out to behave in a more effective way than 
random drivers during periods of low car density, while high car densities produce the 
opposite effect.  
 
In this paper, special emphasis shall be laid on a comparison of the participants’ reactions 
to the immediately preceding payoffs. The results showed that differences in behaviour 
are observed between the culturally divergent groups. 
 
 
2. Experimental setup  
 
The experiments were conducted during September and November 2006. The German 
sessions were run at the BonnEconLab at the University of Bonn, Germany. The first 
three Chinese sessions are located at the Reinhard Selten Lab at Nankai University of 
Tianjin, China and the Chinese sessions 4, 5, 6 are located at the Vernon Smith 
Experimental Lab of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University. At the 3 universities students 
from several departments participated. 
 
Experiments were run by local helpers comprehensively instructed and supported by the 
authors, who stayed in the background. We are aware that this might result in an 
experimenter eﬀect. We decided to choose this procedure to avoid self-presentation and  
face-saving eﬀects Bond & Hwang (1986) of inexperienced subjects resulting from the  
presence of people from foreign countries. Since we are interested in the pure 
presentation eﬀect this procedure seems to be justiﬁed. Instructions were written in 
neutral language. 
 
An anonymous referee asked whether the Germans are more likely to own a license to 
drive a car than the Chinese students. We did not control this question in our experiment. 
It is more likely that more German participants hold a drivers license for a car. We agree 
that this question would have been interesting, but all of he subjects are part of their local 
traffic network, whether they use a car, taxi, bike, e-bike or even walk. We believe that 
every traffic participant can easily understand the setup of this treatment since no one 
likes to be in a traffic jam. We are thankful for the comment of the anonymous referee, 
because in further investigations we will control this question. 
 
To avoid translation errors regarding the task and the cadence instructions were translated 
by natural speakers from German into the corresponding language and afterwards 
translated back into German applying the back-translation method (Brislin, 1970). 
 
For this survey, the Minority Game was transferred to a route choice context Chmura & 
Pitz (2006). In these experiments, subjects were told that in each of the periods 0 to 100, 
they had to make a choice between a road A and a road B for travelling from X to Y.  Six 
sessions were run with German and six sessions with Chinese participants. The number 
of subjects in each session was 9. They were told that the travel times tA and tB on road A 
and B depended on the numbers nA and nB of participants choosing A and B respectively:  
 
BABA nntt <⇔== 0,1  and BAAB nntt >⇔== 0,1 . 
 
The period payoff was At  if A was chosen and Bt  if B was chosen. The total payoff of a 
subject was the sum of all period payoffs in Taler (experimental currency unit) converted 
proportionally to monetary payoffs in Euro respectively RMB. The conversion rate was 1 
Taler = 0.4 € in Germany and 1 Taler  = 2 RMB in China. The difference of the 
conversion rate can be explained by the laboratory standard payoff in each country. The 
experimental data were obtained in 12 sessions with 9 subjects each and 108 altogether. 
The computer program was based on the toolbox RatImage developed by Abbink & 
Sadrieh (1995).  
 
After each of the 100 periods subjects received information about the preceding period, 
the period payoff in Taler, the cumulative payoff and the number of the past period. We 
did not provide any further information. 
 
 
3. Experimental results 
 
In this section, we explain the main statistical findings while later in the subchapters we 
will explain the results in view of the response modes and the cumulative payoff.  
 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics for the Chinese and the German treatment 
 
The basic statistical findings are shown in table 1. Figure 1 shows the number of 
participants on road A as a function of time for a typical observation of the Chinese 
participants and the German group. The mean number of players on road A is 4.5 in the 
Chinese group and 4.49 in German group. This was the expected outcome since the 
experimental setup does not suggest a preference for one road. The Minority Game with 
9 players has 2 252
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The lack of strict pure strategy equilibria poses a coordination problem that may be one 
of the reasons for non-convergence and the persistence of fluctuations in both treatments. 
The mean number of players for the Chinese and the German observations are shown in 
figure 2. There is no significant difference between the German and the Chinese 
treatment for the mean numbers of players choosing the road A.  
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changes (mean) 
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vs. cumulative payoff 
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t  sess. I 01 37 4.33 5.08 .1369 -.48 
sess. I 02 36 4.74 3.87 .1468 .34 
sess. I 03 36 4.41 5.16 .2694 -.44 
sess. I 04 38 4.4 5.19 .0122 -.7 
sess. I 05 37 4.65 5.28 .1128 -.18 
sess. I 06 38 4.44 4.35 -.0083 -.18 
treat. I 37 4.50 4.82 .1116 -.27 
C
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t sess. II 01 38 4.23 3.99 -.1295 -.49 
sess. II 02 38 4.46 3.68 .1281 -.35 
sess. II 03 37 4.49 4.97 -.0245 -.42 
sess. II 04 37 4.57 5.57 .0916 -.63 
sess. II 05 38 4.59 3.39 -.0029 -.35 
sess. II 06 39 4.59 3.36 -.0747 -.52 
treat. II 37.83 4.49 4.16 -.0020 -.46 
 
Table 1: Statistical data of the experiments. 
 
It seems that there is no outstandingly advisable strategy for the participants to enhance 
their payoffs because due to the symmetry of the game, each road has the same 
properties. However, one can see in the next section that in some cases, certain types of 
reactions to former payoffs are more successful than others. 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Number of participants on A: a typical session of the German and the Chinese group. 
 
Table 1 also shows the mean number of road changes, the mean Yule-coefficient and 
cumulative payoff as well as the spearmen rank correlation coefficient for the number of 
road changes versus the cumulative payoff. All these values for the German treatment are 
significantly different from the Chinese treatment. We will try to explain this in section 
3.2 and 3.3 
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Figure 2: Number of participants on road A for the German and the Chinese treatment. 
 
 
3.2. A classifier system of response modes 
 
We used a classifier system for behavioural types introduced by SELTEN ET AL. (2007) to 
describe reactions of former payoffs. The classifier system can be described as follows: A 
participant who had a payoff 0 (1) on the road chosen may change the road (stay on the 
same road) in the next period in order to travel on a less crowded route. We call this the 
direct response mode. The direct response mode is the prevailing one but there is also a 
contrarian response mode. The contrarian participant expects that a payoff 1 (0) will 
attract (deter) many others and that therefore the road chosen will be crowded (free) in 
the next period.  
 
For each subject, let c- (c+) be the number of times in which a subject changes the roads 
when the payoff in the period before was p=0 (p=1). And for each subject let s, (s+) be the 
number of times in which a subject stays on the road when there was a payoff p=0 (p=1) 
in the period before. 
 
 change stay 
 p=0 −c  −s  
 p=1 +c  +s  
 
Table 2: 2x2 table for the computation of Yule-coefficients. 
 
For each subject such a 2x2 table has been determined and a Yule-coefficient Q has 
been computed as follows. 
 
€ 
Q = c− ⋅ s+ − c+ ⋅ s−c− ⋅ s+ + c+ ⋅ s−
 
 
The Yule coefficient has a range from –1 to +1. Participants with a “high” Yule- 
coefficient near to 1 (-1) tend to be direct (contrarian).  
 
The classifier system used in this paper is able to show contrarian and direct responses. 
It does not classify individuals. A direct response of a participant is counted as a direct 
response. It is possible that the same participant is half of the experiment a direct 
responder and in the second half a contrarian responder. 
 
 
3.3. Observed Response mode 
 
To classify behavioural types we used the Yule-coefficient we described this already in 
section 3.2. The mean Yule-coefficients are significantly higher in the German treatment 
(see figure 4). The null-hypothesis for both treatments is rejected by a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney-Test on the significance level of 5% (one-sided). That means that there are less 
contrarian response modes in the German treatment.  
 
The reason for the smaller Yule-coefficients in the Chinese treatment lies in the fact that 
contrarian reactions to former payoffs occur more frequently in this group. One can see in 
table 1 that the number of road changes per round in the German treatment is 
significantly higher than in the Chinese treatment. The null-hypothesis for both 
treatments is rejected by a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test on the significance level of 1% 
(one-sided). Since the players’ mean payoff (for all the experiments) is 37.41 and since 
therefore a player receives more „bad“ than „good“ payoffs on average, the decline in 
road changes in the treatment of Chinese participants is another indicator for an increase 
of contrarian behavioural types. The number or road changes for both treatments is 
graphically shown in figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Mean number of road changes for the German and the Chinese treatment. 
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Figure 4: Yule-Coefficient for the German and the Chinese treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Cumulative Payoff  
 
In Chmura & Pitz (2006), it was already pointed out that a negative correlation exists 
between the cumulative payoff and the frequency of road changes of a player. Figure 5 
shows the mean cumulative payoff for the German and the Chinese treatment. As shown 
in table 1, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is negative for all Chinese sessions 
and 5 German sessions. This also is shown in figure 6. Since the contrarian response 
mode could be observed more frequent in the Chinese treatment and thus, the number of 
“good” payoffs was on average higher than of the “bad” payoffs, it could be expected that 
the Chinese players would on average receive better results than the group with German 
participants. Indeed, table 1 shows that the mean payoff per session is higher in Chinese 
observations than in the German observations. The related null-hypothesis was rejected 
by a Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney-test on the significance level of 5% (one-sided). In the 
case of the Minority Game, the contrarian response mode of the Chinese participants is 
the more promising strategy.  
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Figure 5: Mean cumulative payoff for the German and the Chinese treatment. 
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Figure 6: Spearmen rank correlation coefficient for the cumulative payoff vs. the number 
of road changes. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we discussed an elementary traffic scenario, modelled as a minority game 
with subjects of different cultural backgrounds. We found two response modes using the 
Yule-coefficient. The first response mode is a direct response and the second a contrarian 
response to the received payoff in the last period. The reactions of participants of the two 
investigated groups were significantly different. The German subjects reacted in a more 
direct way than the Chinese, i. e. by the above definition of direct, that they chose the 
same road after good payoffs and changed after bad payoffs. Due to the different 
behaviour and the structure of the minority game the average payoff of the German 
subjects in this game was lower than the average payoff of the Chinese. The less direct 
reactions of the Chinese participants may be caused by their different experience in their 
daily traffic situation. In a crowded inhomogeneous traffic situation a contrarian reaction, 
which anticipates, the possible reactions of the other participants more severely than the 
direct response mode, seems to be reasonable. To our knowledge the comparison of an 
Asian (Chinese) group to a Western (German) group using a response mode as a 
classification scheme was not conducted before. Our results show that groups with a 
different cultural or local background react different to given information, here whether 
they have a payoff or not. We used the classification scheme in traffic context in a 
minority game. The reaction of traffic participants to information (radio, gps or the 
internet) is important to develop better precast systems for traffic routes. The game we 
used was simple and a very limited model compared to the real life traffic. One can 
assume that the different response modes and the different reactions to the given 
information (here just the payoff) may lead to a stronger reaction in the daily route choice 
behaviour. The finding that the Chinese group responds in a more contrarian way than the 
German group is an important insight and needs further research, whether this holds true 
for other games and situations as well.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Leaflet to minority experiment 
 
Leaflet to minority experiment 
 
 
        Welcome to the experiment 
 
        Procedure: 
 
- Altogether 9 persons are participating in this experiment. The game situation is the same for 
every participant. 
 
- The experiment consists of 100 periods. 
 
- In each period you are travelling from a starting point X to an arrival point Y. You can 
either choose road A or road B to get from X to Y (see drawing). 
 
                                                     Road A 
 
 
                                             X Y 
 
 
              Road B 
 
- After your decision which road you choose, you will get a payoff if you are on the road, 
which the minority has chosen. In this game 9 players interact with each other.  An example 
would be:  
-  
- 3 participants choose road A and 6 participants choose road B, then each of the 3 participants 
on road A get the payoff of 1 Taler and the 6 participants on road B get the payoff 0 Taler.  
 
5 participants choose road A and 4 participants choose road B, then each of the 4 participants 
on road B get the payoff 1 Taler and the 5 participants on road A get the payoff 0 Taler. 
 
- You can make a new route choice in every period. 
 
- The following information you will get after each period:  
 
-  
• Your route chosen in the preceding period. 
• Your period payoffs in the preceding period in Talers. 
• Your cumulated payoffs before the route choice in Talers. 
• Number of the current period. 
 
 
- The exchange rate is 0,40 € (2 RMB in the Chinese treatment) per Taler. 
 
Thank you for participating! 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Screenshot Of The Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
